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Actors and authority contexts

An actor is a person, client or process performing an operation in a defined authority context. Product labels such as customer, worker and administrator explain responsibilities. The verified account, live company/person relationships and the requested resource determine actual access.

One person can participate in several companies or surfaces. Neither an email address nor a visible role label alone selects the company or person for a privileged operation. Caller authority describes how the accepted token and live SQL projections establish request context.

Actor Typical work Required context and boundary
Principal office staff Customers, quotes, projects, planning and follow-up Selected company, live staff membership, operation capabilities and record scope
Company administrator Company configuration and delegated access Explicit capabilities; this title does not grant platform authority
Principal worker Assigned execution, own time and field collaboration Live worker identity, assignment/publication and operation-specific own-work rules
Customer person Authorized project collaboration and customer actions Exact live non-worker person/company pair and admitted customer/project relationship
Subcontractor staff or worker Responses, awarded work and submissions Their own UE company plus the principal’s request/commitment grant
Platform administrator Explicit platform administration Live platform capability in a selected operator-designated platform tenant, outside impersonation
External AI client Authorized MCP reads and supported proposals Verified bearer, current tool gate, capabilities, resource policy and tool-specific confirmation
Public quote recipient Read or respond to the offered quote Valid quote-token/version lifecycle, distinct from an authenticated customer portal session

The actor categories are not a substitute for a complete permission matrix. For example, UE staff are staff in their own company; that flag does not open the principal’s office or purchase-cost queue. Portal surfaces explains how the browser presents these contexts.

The authentication foundation resolves live people and memberships from the verified Auth account. An active tenant in an accepted token selects the internal request context; stored account preference affects later token issuance. Current role grants and capability relationships determine live authority.

Customer admission additionally retains the exact company/person pair returned by the owning SQL projection. A person can have customer-wide access or an independent direct-project-contact basis. The latter admits only the named project. The displayed contact name never selects the authenticated person. Customer access owns the full admission contract and stronger permissions for recipient edits and completion.

A role grant, customer contact, ROT/RUT recipient, employee assignment and UE commitment each establish different relationships. Revoking one relationship does not necessarily remove an independent basis. Hiding a link in the browser changes presentation; the API, database or token flow must refuse the unauthorized operation separately.

Scheduled workers and provider callbacks are also authority-bearing entry points, but they do not represent a human clicking a page. A worker processes a scoped durable intent or claim under its own service contract. A webhook must pass its signature or shared-secret policy before processing the related provider event. A service-role credential is technical privilege, not a business actor or proof of permission.

For AI work, proposal creation and confirmation retain the caller and reviewed version. Confirmation can create an ordinary editable quote; it does not represent customer acceptance or authorize every external effect. See proposals and background outcomes.

Suppose a synthetic account is office staff in Company A and direct contact for one project in Company B. Its internal workspace can remain A while the customer project endpoint establishes the separate admitted B/person context. Sending an A invoice still requires A’s capability and invoice scope. The contact relationship in B does not grant B-wide recipient editing.

The sources establish actor predicates, route guards and relationship owners at the declared revision. They do not establish that every possible combination has been exercised in the shared environment. Actor verification, resource admission and action confirmation remain separate checks.