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Credentials and protected configuration

Secret values belong in the accepted secret source and protected component configuration, not Git, browser builds, documentation, logs or review artifacts. Git records variable names, scopes, ownership and verification procedures. The runtime broker turns the provider’s scoped values into validated consumer files.

The Infisical environment name prod and historical production labels identify infrastructure. They do not change Toolora’s pre-launch status or authorize real provider tests. Environment and effects retains that separate contract.

Configuration class Owner and destination Constraint
API secrets Toolora Infisical API scope → /etc/toolora/api.env Root-owned, toolora-secrets group, mode 0640; service reads with the declared group
Supabase secrets Component-specific scope → protected Supabase consumer file Root-owned/systemd injection; not browser or test configuration
Alerting credentials Dedicated alerting scope and consumer Separate secret credentials from nonsecret addressing/settings
Browser settings Intended public URLs and anon/publishable client value Any VITE_* value can enter the inspectable bundle; no service-role/provider secret
Human recovery Existing Kugghuset 1Password toolora vault Human recovery boundary; automation access and local persistence are not enabled
Automated fixtures Synthetic credentials and local/disposable stack No ambient shared runtime dotenv or secret-provider read
Repository evidence Names, scopes, modes and sanitized outcomes Never a credential value, token-bearing URL or private key

The policy and broker classify required, optional, unused and nonsecret settings. Missing required values prevent reconciliation/startup. Optional absence is supported only where the feature’s own boundary fails closed. Unused provider keys are not written into a consumer just because they exist.

Secret and nonsecret inputs are validated together where the component requires them. A renamed consumer key, broader permission, unexpected test consumer or drift between policy and broker must fail validation. The current policy declares no test secret consumer; a historical retired test identity is not a reusable access path.

The API’s dotenv parser disables value interpolation. A credential containing variable-like characters must not be expanded using ambient process values. Frontend public configuration is resolved at build time; replacing a backend secret does not rewrite a published browser bundle.

The owning procedure verifies a replacement before revoking the old credential. Retain the last known-good runtime configuration until the replacement is usable, perform the non-mutating synchronization check and use the controlled restart/release path. Check component version/health and the affected authorized function; a file’s existence alone does not prove that the running process uses it.

The policy’s rotation interval is a declared requirement, not evidence that the latest rotation occurred. A source-reviewed handbook cannot certify secret freshness, access to the recovery vault or a completed rotation. Those need a scoped operational record without values.

On AX42, commands needing the API file run as the service user with the read-only supplementary group, following the working agreement. Running them as root can leave unreadable state in the user’s workspace and break backup. Do not solve a permission failure by broadening the file mode or copying the file into a build.

A synthetic broker test supplies a required-key omission or a consumer-writable file. The check must refuse it. A replacement fixture with the correct key mapping and protected file mode can pass without reaching the real secret provider. This proves policy behaviour, not a live credential replacement.

For a browser configuration failure, use the intended public endpoint/client value and exact build identity. Adding a service-role key would cross the wrong boundary. Frontend configuration and trust boundaries explain why.

Policy/broker tests use temporary files and synthetic providers. This pass does not log into Infisical, inspect runtime secret values, rotate credentials or modify provider bindings. Logging rules and release ownership identify the adjacent evidence boundaries.