Verify recovery across application boundaries
A recovery claim requires the data, identities, credentials and services needed by its named application scenario. Successful backup, database restore and Storage-object comparison are component facts. They do not automatically establish usable authentication, decrypted source access, application startup or a recovered business outcome.
The estate owns backup implementation. Use its generation-bound inventory and evidence through shared ownership, rather than creating a second backup system. This procedure describes the acceptance boundary; it does not authorize a shared restore.
Prerequisites
Section titled “Prerequisites”Agree an explicitly authorized isolated target and scenario with the infrastructure owner. Prevent outbound provider effects before starting restored application processes. Identify the exact snapshot/generation, component versions, catalogue and manifests. Keep protected credentials in the approved recovery channel, separate from ordinary evidence.
The current owner document records a 2026-09-30 database and complete Storage restore from the same exact B2 snapshot/generation. Counts and object hashes passed in those component checks. They did not establish combined application startup, Auth/credential recovery, mail decryption, measured RTO or recurring recovery success.
Recovery verification procedure
Section titled “Recovery verification procedure”- Inventory what the scenario needs: database records and grants, Storage metadata and bytes, Auth identities/access, runtime configuration, component code and any encryption identity. State exclusions before executing.
- Verify backup identity, timestamp, component coverage and hashes. A current service exit code is not evidence that every required artifact belongs to the same recoverable generation.
- Restore only to the authorized isolated target using the estate procedure and the repository’s image-specific requirements. Wait for full container health where required;
pg_isreadyalone can precede image initialization. Never overwrite the persistent shared database or import password hashes casually. - Before compatibility migrations, use
scripts/db/schema_catalogue.pyto compare the restored schema with the generation’s recorded catalogue. Compare count-only inventories and Storage object hashes.supabase db diffcannot reliably represent all objects in this schema. - Recover the necessary Auth/configuration/decryption boundary through its owning procedure. The mail-intake manifest requires database, ciphertext objects and a recovered age identity with a decryption fixture together. Its
declared_not_verifiedstatus is not a successful drill. - Start the compatible application with provider effects safely disabled. Verify the named actor’s access, authorized record/files and affected application behaviour. Keep synthetic destructive fixtures on their own target, never the restored customer dataset.
- Record recovery-point identity, start/end times, measured elapsed interval, checks, exclusions and failures without payloads or secrets. Compare actual measurements with objectives only within this scenario.
Acceptance reference
Section titled “Acceptance reference”| Check | Establishes | Still needs separate evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Backup metadata and hashes | Named artifacts were preserved intact | Restorability and generation coverage |
| Database catalogue/counts | Compared definitions and inventory match | Record semantics, object access and application outcome |
| Storage bytes and hashes | Named object contents match | Correct authorization and linked-record behaviour |
| Auth/configuration/decryption | Required identity paths work within the drill | Complete affected business scenario |
| Application scenario | Named outcome on the recovered target | Other scenarios, recurring proof and unrelated provider state |
Failure handling and timing limits
Section titled “Failure handling and timing limits”Stop at a missing generation, mismatched catalogue, absent identity or unsafe outbound path. Preserve safe diagnostics and obtain the owning correction. Do not delete a usable backup, rewrite evidence or point reset/seed tools at restored private data to obtain a pass.
RPO 60 minutes and RTO 240 minutes remain objectives associated with the open recovery outcome. Nightly backups and no established PITR do not prove the RPO objective. A component drill without combined application timing does not prove RTO. Keep those gaps explicit in limitations.
Application rollback selects a previous compatible release; it does not restore the database or reverse provider effects. Schema publication, credential recovery and evidence interpretation identify the separate owners. A synthetic recovery of one project and attachment can prove that scenario while honestly leaving payroll, mail decryption or historical reconciliation outside scope.